Constant body switching
If your consciousness switches to a different brain then your memories will also change to that of the new brain and thus you will not realize that you earlier had a conscious experience in a different brain.
So while you do experience life in all conscious bodies you will only have memories being your current body. You only having your current body would bed an illusion and the next moment you will exist in a new body having the illusion of only having been that body.
I think some of this stuff I think highlights the flaw in basing too much importance on empirical consciousness. Especially if you view consciousness as this thing in itself that somehow interacts with physical reality in a strange unilateral fashion. Really, questions of identity relating to it are ultimately intractable, because our faculty of understanding and sensibility should be contingent on the physical structure of our brains, rendering any particularity which differentiates different instances of awareness unclear, and may be ultimately impossible to tease out as it shouldn't interact with physical reality... This, however, raises the question of how consciousness is even intelligible in the first instance? It seems indubitable, but if reason is contingent on the physical, and consciousness is supraphysical, then how can reason even access it?
On this topic I believe there is a way to formally solve this particular dilemma, along the lines of The Resolution of Newcomb's Paradox by Chris Langan. Our first move is to view physical structures as they were (finite) state automata. There is 2 parts of this interpretation. First there is the aspect of our structure that accepts information, and then there is the part that transduces information. Obviously, the transduction of an automata is contingent on internal states which is contingent on the structure of the acceptor. In the case of descriptive closure (i.e. can the physical at all access the mental?) we would have to consider how the acceptor functions. We may denote an acceptor as F = (Q, S,d,q_0,A), where Q is some non-empty set of internal states, S is an alphabet of symbols which may use to produce strings, d is a transition mapping, q_0 is the initial state, and A is the accepting syntax. Our approach of formalization would be to introduce non-determinacy. Now the most often approach to having an automata operate non-deterministically is by altering the state transition syntax so that the outputs give us some set of possible outcomes as opposed to a single one. However, there is a subtler method that can be used that the paper mentions, namely to alter the accepting syntax. To quote:
Nondeterminism is not always restricted to Q x S; under certain conditions, either Q or S can be extended, or A shifted within Q. This. of course, entails a modification of F, unless F is defined to allow for parametric extension and adjustment. To this effect, let F' be such an open extension. To be meaningful in mechanistic contexts such as those in which acceptors are usually considered, F' must exist within an appropriate mechanistic extension of the computative environment of F. Organisms, being mechanical in the deterministic sense, need not be distinguished in this extension. Nondeterminism can be used to subtly manipulate recognition, thus cryptically modifying an acceptor's reality. Nondeterministic recognition can help to explain the ability of an acceptor to rapidly sieze certain kinds of higher-order phenomena, or even interact with higher-order agencies ordinarily insensible to it. [emphasis added]
To put it in the context of physical systems, the accepting syntax of such processes normally consists of those conforming to the type "physical". In some similar manner, if there was some mental plane, it's accepting syntax is posited of the mental. However, there is no reason a priori why the accepting syntax, in some special circumstances may not shift. This at the very least shows that they two interact, but it does not explain to what extent they interact and more importantly doesn't give any reason still as to why some empirical consciousness appears to have some spatial-temporal locality to it that differentiates it from other consciousnesses. Indeed, different consciousnesses qua internal states need to have some form of distinction, otherwise by principle of identity, we should all consciously experience the exact same perspective which would be one that is basically a Duchamp paintings of the infinite multiplicity of physical vantage points. There is also the issue of providing a mechanism for interaction between the two types which would probably entail locality.
I think this guy presents an interesting mechanism to solve all of this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Kj-M3syY-w
Basically his answer here is that empirical consciousness is not fundamental. What's fundamental is the self, and ultimately the Brahman/Agathon/Absolute. The soul is ultimately a "signal" (i.e perturbations) in this larger space of ultimate reality. Now, physical matter has the ability to "tune in" to this "signal" such that empirical consciousness is consubstantially (term that is particular to this youtuber) generated. From this perspective, the individuality, locality, and uniqueness of empirical consciousnesses are granted albeit I feel as though the concept of reincarnation is lost depending on how you end up understanding this more fundamental self? Actually I think the Atman may also be one of the most sophisticated formulations of One Soul Theory.
I guess a side note that I just realized is that perhaps for Chris Langan's CTMU the essential differences between different vantage points of conscious observers is granted by the status he calls "telor".
Could it be the case that there is really only a single consciousness in the universe meaning what we view as different consciousnesses are all just different manifistations of one single consciousness?
This would mean that by stabbing someone else you would essentially be stabbing yourself, if you rape someone you essentially just rape yourself, if you send your repist to jail you send yourself to jail.
People believing in this may end up acting nicer to other people (since they do not want to hurt themselves) or less nice then they do not really have to feel bad about it (it's like self-harm).
This is actually something I definitely something that I don't get about Advaita Vedanta. Even with this identity with primal oneness, this doesn't really give much reason why you shouldn't do evil other than "that's you!". Really when you understand things like this, it feels more like the one fundamental consciousness is more so a guarantor of ontological coherence, with aspects that are more closely related to one's individuality being contingent on materiality, and/or maybe the telic as well.
Other things to ponder... what exactly does any of this mean for reincarnation? This might have ramifications of things like darwinian vintologi. Also another thing I wonder about is what happens if you construct a copy of your brain from the signal point of view? Would the two empirical consciousnesses be able to share any information? Furthermore what exactly is the nature of this tuning mechanism? Is it possible to rewire a brain such that it tunes into another signal? Many questions
